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Notes and Definitions
This report draws on statistics from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
When the report was published, HHS had yet to release certain data for 2012 and 2013. 
Therefore, the report draws on statistics from 2011 and 2012 in some cases.
Figures for government spending that are expressed in 2013 dollars were converted from nominal 
amounts with the price index for personal consumption expenditures, which is calculated by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Unless this report indicates otherwise, the years that it mentions are federal fiscal years, which run 
from October 1 to September 30. References to states include the District of Columbia. Numbers 
in the text may not add up to totals because of rounding.
AFDC (Aid to Families With Dependent Children): A program that provided cash assistance to 
low-income families and that was replaced by TANF.
Contingency fund: A mechanism that can increase the amount of federal TANF funding available 
to states that are experiencing economic downturns.
DRA (Deficit Reduction Act of 2005): A law that made various modifications to TANF, 
including the imposition of a more stringent work standard.
JOBS (Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training): A program that supported recipients’ ability 
to work and that was replaced by TANF.
MOE (maintenance-of-effort) requirement: A rule that penalizes a state in which nonfederal 
spending on TANF is less than 75 percent of nonfederal spending in 1994 on the programs that 
preceded TANF.
PRWORA (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996): The law 
that established TANF.
SFAG (state family assistance grant): A block grant through which almost all of the federal 
government’s TANF funding takes place.
SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program): A program that provides nutrition 
assistance to low-income families.
SSI (Supplemental Security Income): A program that provides cash assistance to disabled and 
elderly people with low income.
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families): A program that provides cash assistance, work 
support, and other services to low-income families.
Work participation rate: The percentage of families getting TANF cash assistance that include an 
adult “engaged in work”—that is, participating in a qualifying work-related activity for a sufficient 
number of hours per week.
Work standard: A set of rules that requires a state to maintain a certain work participation rate.
www.cbo.gov/publication/49887
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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families:
Spending and Policy Options
Summary
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is a 
federal program that provides cash assistance, work sup-
port, and other services to some low-income families. 
The cash assistance is generally limited to families with 
income well below the poverty threshold and few assets; it 
goes to roughly 2 million families per month, most of 
them headed by single mothers. The work support (such 
as subsidized child care) and the other services (such as 
initiatives to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 
promote marriage) are usually available to families with 
income up to twice the poverty threshold.
The states administer TANF and have considerable lati-
tude in determining the mix of cash assistance, work sup-
port, and other services that it provides. However, if too 
few families receiving cash assistance are participating in 
work-related activities, a state can lose some federal fund-
ing. States therefore impose work requirements on recipi-
ents of cash assistance. Also, those recipients face federal 
limits on how long they are eligible for cash assistance. 
The work requirements and the time limits are intended 
to achieve one of TANF’s goals: ending recipients’ 
dependence on government benefits.
How Much Is Spent on TANF and What 
Does It Provide?
Almost all of the federal government’s TANF funding 
takes place through a block grant called the state family 
assistance grant (SFAG). Because the size of that grant has 
not been adjusted for inflation, its purchasing power has 
declined by about 25 percent since 1998, the first full 
year the program was in operation. Through the SFAG 
and a smaller funding mechanism called the contingency 
fund, the federal government spent $17 billion on TANF 
in 2013, which was the lowest inflation-adjusted amount 
in the program’s history.
TANF is funded not only by the federal government but 
also by the states, which must document a certain 
amount of nonfederal funding (often state funding, but 
also funding from local governments and private organi-
zations) to avoid losing part of their SFAG allotments. 
States that spend more than that amount can receive 
more federal support through the contingency fund. In 
2013, states reported spending about $15 billion of 
nonfederal money on services intended to meet TANF’s 
goals. For the most part, state and federal funds support 
the same array of TANF services.
Most TANF funding was initially spent on cash assis-
tance. Between 1998 and 2008, however, the share of 
funding spent on cash assistance fell from about 65 per-
cent to about 30 percent. A number of changes explain 
that decline. For one thing, the number of families receiv-
ing cash assistance, which had already fallen from 5 mil-
lion in 1995 under the program that preceded TANF to 
3 million in 1998 under TANF, continued to fall through 
2008. Also, the inflation-adjusted value of the monthly 
benefit that those families received decreased substan-
tially. Meanwhile, spending on work support and on 
other services grew. Cash assistance, work support, and 
other services now account for about a third of total 
TANF funding apiece.
Over the past few years, only about one-quarter of fami-
lies with income below the poverty threshold have 
received TANF cash assistance in a typical month. The 
average monthly benefit was about $400, or roughly 
one-third of the poverty threshold for a family of two.
How Does TANF Compare With Other 
Federal Programs and Tax Credits for 
Low-Income Families?
Spending on TANF has been declining as a share of 
federal spending on means-tested programs (that is, pro-
grams targeted at people with low income) and tax credits 
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for low-income people. As the inflation-adjusted value of 
federal spending has fallen for TANF, it has increased 
substantially over the past two decades for many of the 
other programs and credits: Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), which provides cash assistance to low-
income people who are elderly or have disabilities; the 
earned income and child tax credits, which help low-
income people who have earnings; and programs that 
provide health care, nutrition assistance, and grants 
for college and other postsecondary education to low-
income people. Today, the federal government spends 
far more on many of those programs and tax credits 
than on TANF.
Most families that receive cash assistance through TANF 
also receive health insurance through Medicaid and nutri-
tion assistance through the school meal programs and the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). 
Some TANF families also receive additional cash assis-
tance because of a family member’s disability or through 
the earned income and child tax credits. In addition, a 
small number of families receiving cash assistance 
through TANF receive subsidized housing.
How Does TANF Affect Employment?
Like many means-tested programs, TANF creates an 
incentive not to work by reducing benefits as recipients’ 
earnings rise. However, the program includes mecha-
nisms to counter that effect. In particular, the federal 
government requires a certain percentage of each state’s 
adult cash assistance recipients—50 percent, before 
adjustments are made—to be either employed or partici-
pating in activities that could lead to employment. If that 
“work standard” is not met, states risk losing some of 
their TANF funding (though they can take a variety of 
measures to retain it). States therefore require most adult 
recipients to work or to prepare for employment in other 
ways.
The work standard and state work requirements generally 
apply only to people who are the parents of children 
receiving cash assistance and who are not disabled. In 
most years, only about a third of those adults have had 
enough hours in qualifying activities to count as work 
participants. But that level of participation nevertheless 
allowed most states to meet the work standard before 
2007, because the federal government, in accordance 
with the law that established TANF, reduced each state’s 
50 percent requirement in proportion to the reduction in 
the number of families receiving cash assistance in that 
state since 1995.
In 2007, however, the Congress changed the work stan-
dard’s reference year from 1995 to 2005; that is, the 
50 percent requirement would now be reduced in pro-
portion to each state’s (much smaller) reduction in the 
number of families receiving cash assistance since 2005. 
To date, most states have met the higher work standard 
that resulted by using a variety of approaches, but not by 
increasing the number of recipients with enough hours 
in qualifying activities. The states that have failed to 
meet the higher work standard run the risk of incurring 
financial penalties.
How Would Various Policy Options Affect TANF?
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has assessed 
12 ways that the Congress might decide to change TANF. 
Those options are listed in Table 1. 
The first five options would change the size of the SFAG 
or the contingency fund. Two of those options would 
affect the federal budget deficit over the next 10 years; the 
remaining three would shift TANF funding to different 
groups of low-income families but keep the total amount 
of federal spending constant. 
The next five options would change the TANF work 
standard. In general, loosening the work standard would 
give states more flexibility to experiment and to provide 
the services that they thought were best for their resi-
dents; tightening it could prevent families from becoming 
dependent on government aid. Those options would 
probably not have a significant effect on the federal bud-
get: Though they could change the extent to which states 
paid penalties for violating the work standard, those 
penalties are typically quite small.
The final two options would change the incentives for 
states to spend their own money on TANF. Those 
options could affect how many families have access to 
cash assistance. But they would probably not have a sig-
nificant effect on the federal budget, because states would 
probably adhere to the new requirements and thus avoid 
losing part of their SFAG allotments.
An Overview of TANF
TANF, usually pronounced “tan-if,” was established by 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
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Table 1.
Options for Changing TANF
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note:  TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
a. The maintenance-of-effort requirement penalizes a state in which nonfederal spending on TANF is less than 75 percent of nonfederal 
spending in 1994 on the programs that preceded TANF.
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The program—
which replaced Aid to Families With Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and two smaller programs, Job Oppor-
tunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) and Emergency 
Assistance—gives states more flexibility than its predeces-
sors did to determine how to spend federal aid to low-
income families.1 The federal government provides a 
block grant that, PRWORA specifies, states may use “in 
any manner reasonably calculated” to achieve four goals:
 Providing assistance to needy families so that children 
may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes 
of relatives;
 Ending the dependence of needy parents on 
government benefits by promoting work, job 
preparation, and marriage;
 Preventing and reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies; 
and
 Encouraging the formation and maintenance of 
two-parent families.
To reduce dependence on cash assistance, TANF restricts 
most adults from receiving it for more than five years over 
the course of their lives. (Under AFDC, low-income fam-
ilies were entitled to monthly cash payments with few 
strings attached.) Also, the federal government imposes a 
work standard on each state that specifies how many cash 
assistance recipients must participate in work-related 
activities. States risk losing a modest portion of their 
federal TANF funding if they do not meet the standard, 
so all of them require recipients of cash assistance to 
participate in work-related activities.
A family’s eligibility for TANF is based on the amounts of 
its income and assets. Most of the families receiving cash 
assistance have income far below the poverty threshold, 
and in many cases, only the children in a family receive 
benefits.
Options That Change Funding
Options That Change the 
Work Standard
Options That Change the 
Maintenance-of-Effort Requirement
Option 1: Reduce the State Family 
Assistance Grant by 10 Percent
Option 6: Prohibit States From Using 
Different Work Standards
Option 11: Prohibit States From Counting 
Private Spending Toward the
Maintenance-of-Effort Requirementa
Option 2: Increase the State Family 
Assistance Grant to Account for Inflation
Option 7: Credit States for Former 
Recipients' Continued Employment, 
Not for Caseload Reductions
Option 12: Require States to Spend at 
Least One-Fifth of TANF Funding on 
Cash Assistance
Option 3: Link the State Family Assistance 
Grant to the Unemployment Rate
Option 8: Eliminate Credits for Spending in 
Excess of the Maintenance-of-Effort 
Requirementa
Option 4: Make the Contingency Fund 
More Responsive to High Unemployment
Option 9: Loosen the Limit on Counting 
Job Readiness Activities as Engagement 
in Work
Option 5: Reinstate Supplemental Grants 
but Reduce the Contingency Fund
Option 10: Loosen the Limit on Counting 
Vocational Education as Engagement 
in Work
1. In this report, the word “family” usually refers to an arrangement 
in which at least one adult lives with at least one child under the 
age of 18.
4 TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES: SPENDING AND POLICY OPTIONS JANUARY 2015
CBO
Eligibility
According to federal law, only families with needy chil-
dren may receive cash assistance through TANF, but the 
states determine what constitutes need. Almost no states 
accept applications for cash assistance from families with 
income above the poverty threshold, which is about 
$1,300 a month for a family of two, and in about half 
of the states, the income limit for cash assistance is less 
than half of the poverty threshold. In many states, recipi-
ents who quickly find work continue to receive cash 
assistance for several months, even if their income has 
grown past the limit; that approach increases their incen-
tive to work. Initial eligibility for TANF is also restricted 
to families with few assets (not counting some vehicles). 
The asset threshold in most states is under $5,000.
The states also determine the size of the payments that 
families receive; those payments are usually smaller for 
families with other income and for families with fewer 
eligible members. Adults are typically ineligible if they are 
disabled and receiving SSI benefits or if they have immi-
grated to the United States within the past five years. In 
addition, nonparental caretakers seldom qualify for pay-
ments; one common reason is that their income is too 
high. As a result, in many of the families receiving cash 
assistance, only the children are eligible, so those families 
get smaller payments than they would if the adults were 
also eligible.
Many families are eligible for cash assistance for a limited 
time. In particular, PRWORA allows families with adult 
recipients to receive federally funded cash assistance for 
no more than five years. States have the option of setting 
shorter time limits, however, and 13 of them had done so 
as of 2013. States may also exempt up to 20 percent of 
families with adult recipients from the five-year limit if 
those families have experienced hardship (as defined by 
each state); nevertheless, as of 2012, in only six states had 
more than 10 percent of adult recipients received benefits 
for more than five years.
The states tend to set broader eligibility criteria for other 
TANF-funded services than for cash assistance. The work 
support, pregnancy prevention, and family formation ser-
vices funded by TANF are usually available to families 
with income up to twice the poverty threshold.2 The 
rationale is that some of those activities are designed to 
prevent families from falling into poverty in the first 
place, whereas cash assistance is meant to assist families 
already in poverty.
Characteristics of Recipients
From 2006 through 2013, about 1.7 million families 
received cash assistance through TANF in an average 
month. Most of those families had very low income. In 
2012, only about 25 percent had any cash income from a 
source other than TANF, and that income was about 
$600 per month, on average—about 45 percent of the 
poverty threshold for a family of two. Most of the income 
came from employment.
Since PRWORA was enacted, fewer parents have received 
cash benefits on their own behalf, and the result is that 
children have become a larger percentage of beneficiaries. 
In 2012, about three-quarters of cash assistance was pro-
vided on behalf of children. Of those children, roughly 
half lived in families in which the adults were ineligible 
for cash assistance, and most of the others lived with one 
adult recipient. Of parents who did receive cash benefits 
on their own behalf, about 85 percent were mothers 
(most of them in their twenties), and 87 percent were 
single or separated.
Many cash recipients also benefited from the other ser-
vices funded by TANF. The federal government does not 
generally collect information on families that receive only 
those other services; however, in 2002, the Government 
Accountability Office found that the states were provid-
ing TANF-funded child care to several hundred thousand 
low-income families that were not receiving cash assis-
tance.3 That is probably still the case, because the states 
continue to spend a substantial portion of their TANF 
funding on subsidized child care—which goes to only 
a small percentage of the families that receive cash 
assistance.
Spending on TANF
TANF is funded by the federal government and the 
states. In 2013, a total of $32 billion was spent on TANF, 
the lowest amount in the program’s history after inflation 
is accounted for. That money was spent on monthly cash 
2. Gene Falk, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block 
Grant: An Introduction, Report for Congress R40946 
(Congressional Research Service, January 2014).
3. Government Accountability Office, States Provide TANF-Funded 
Work Support Services to Many Low-Income Families Who Do 
Not Receive Cash Assistance, GAO-02-615T (April 2002), 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-615T.
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Figure 1.
Federal Funding and Spending for TANF and the Programs That Preceded It, 1994 to 2013
Billions of Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: PRWORA replaced three programs—Aid to Families With Dependent Children, Emergency Assistance, and Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Training—with TANF.
This figure includes TANF funding that states transferred to the Child Care and Development Block Grant and to the Social Services 
Block Grant.
Because the available data are limited, the figure does not include three of the smaller federal funding mechanisms for TANF. In every 
year, those mechanisms have provided less than $0.3 billion in total.
Vertical bars indicate the duration of recessions.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; PRWORA = Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996.
payments, activities that increased parents’ ability to 
work, and other services for low-income families.
Federal Spending
Before PRWORA was enacted, federal funding for cash 
assistance through AFDC was directly tied to the amount 
that states spent on cash assistance: If the latter rose, the 
former rose. PRWORA changed that arrangement, fixing 
the size of the main TANF grant at $16.5 billion, which 
was the highest level of funding that the states had 
received under AFDC, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance 
combined. That funding level was not increased subse-
quently to keep up with inflation; as a result, the value of 
federal funding, adjusted for inflation, declined by about 
25 percent from 1998 to 2013 (see Figure 1).
Even though the value of federal funding through the 
main TANF grant has declined steadily with the rising 
cost of living, total spending on the program has 
fluctuated. One reason for that difference is that states are 
allowed to save TANF funding to spend in future years; 
they accumulated substantial balances of funds during 
the late 1990s, when economic growth was strong, and 
then increased spending by depleting those balances after 
the 2001 recession. In addition, the federal government 
temporarily boosted TANF funding (not through the 
main grant, however) in response to the 2007 recession.
The federal government currently provides most of its 
TANF funding to the states through two mechanisms:4
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Inflation-Adjusted Spending
(2013 dollars)
Inflation-Adjusted Funding
(2013 dollars)
Nominal Funding
PRWORA
Implemented
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
4. The federal government also provides up to $150 million a year in 
TANF grants to promote marriage and responsible fatherhood; 
$78 million a year in TANF grants to Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 
Virgin Islands; and $8 million a year for TANF work support 
programs operated by Native American tribes. In this report, those 
mechanisms are not included in TANF spending because data 
about them are limited.
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Figure 2.
Federal Funding Through the State Family Assistance Grant, by State, 2013
2013 Dollars per Family Below the Poverty Threshold
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: To divide the 50 states and the District of Columbia into five groups (or quintiles), this chart includes 11 states in the middle quintile.
Neither the definition of poverty nor the funding amounts are adjusted for differences among the states in the cost of living. If they 
were, the differences in funding between the quintiles would generally be smaller, because the states in the lower quintiles typically 
have lower costs of living.
 The state family assistance grant. The SFAG, which 
totals $16.5 billion, has accounted for over 95 percent 
of TANF’s federal funding in most years. Through 
that block grant, each state is entitled to the highest 
annual level of federal funding that it had received for 
the programs that preceded TANF. Consequently, 
states that spent less on AFDC, and therefore received 
less federal funding, during the early 1990s continue 
to receive less federal funding through TANF. If the 
states are ranked by SFAG funding per poor family in 
2013, the top 10 states received about $4,800 per 
poor family, compared with about $800 for the 
bottom 10 states (see Figure 2).5
 The contingency fund. This mechanism can increase 
the amount of funding available to states that are 
experiencing economic downturns. To be eligible, a 
state must have a high and rising unemployment rate 
or higher enrollment in SNAP than it had in the 
past. In addition, the state must document an increase 
in nonfederal spending on TANF. The federal 
government allocated $2 billion to the contingency 
fund when it was established in 1996, but few states 
drew from the fund until the depths of the recent 
severe recession, when roughly 20 states did. All of the 
money in the fund was obligated by the end of fiscal 
year 2010, but the Congress provided $334 million 
$800
Average Amount of
Funding, by Quintile
$4,800
$3,000
$2,200
$1,500
5. In general, comparisons among states in this report are not 
adjusted for differences among the states in the cost of living. 
Here, for example, neither the definition of poverty nor the 
funding amounts are so adjusted. If they were, the difference in 
funding between the two groups of states would be smaller, 
because the average cost of living is lower in the bottom 10 states 
than in the top 10.
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for it in 2011, about $610 million in 2012, and about 
$610 million again in 2013.6
In the recent past, the federal government has provided 
two additional sources of funding for TANF:
 The emergency contingency fund. This fund, which was 
established by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided $5 billion over 
the course of 2009 and 2010 to help states handle the 
additional need for aid created by the recession.
 Supplemental grants. These block grants provided 
additional funding to states where, before the advent 
of TANF, the ratio of AFDC spending to the number 
of people living in poverty had been relatively low. 
The grants also provided funding to states that had 
experienced high population growth in the early 
1990s. Because SFAG funding for each state is based 
on its historic AFDC spending, the supplemental 
grants slightly reduced differences in total funding 
among the states. They went to 17 states, closing 
about 5 percent of the gap in funding per poor family 
between those states and the rest of the country. The 
grants provided $319 million per year between 2001, 
when they were fully implemented, and 2011, when 
they expired.
Federally funded spending on TANF has fluctuated mod-
erately with economic conditions. In 2003, when the 
unemployment rate peaked at 6 percent in the wake of 
the 2001 recession, the states responded by spending an 
additional $1.9 billion of federal funding on TANF, 
drawing on savings from previous years (see Figure 3). By 
2005, states’ balances of unobligated federal funding had 
dipped to $1.9 billion. Few states managed to replenish 
those balances before a more severe recession began in 
2007; this time, the states again provided additional 
TANF services, but instead of drawing heavily on savings, 
they used money from the contingency fund and the 
emergency contingency fund. Spending from those funds 
peaked at $3.2 billion in 2010. 
Despite those fluctuations, TANF spending has been less 
responsive to economic conditions than spending for 
some other programs that provide income security.7 
One reason that other programs are more responsive is 
that their funding changes according to the number of 
eligible recipients. For example, all people who meet the 
eligibility criteria for unemployment compensation can 
receive benefits through that program by enrolling. In 
contrast, the amount of funding provided through the 
SFAG is not adjusted automatically to changes in the 
number of families that are eligible for TANF-funded 
services.
State Spending
The amount that states spend on TANF is affected by 
federal rules, states’ financial conditions, and other fac-
tors. The most important federal rule is the maintenance-
of-effort (MOE) requirement, which is designed to limit 
the extent to which federal funding displaces money that 
state governments would otherwise have spent on services 
for low-income families. Specifically, for each dollar that 
nonfederal spending on TANF is less than 75 percent 
of nonfederal spending in 1994 on the programs that 
preceded TANF, the state loses a dollar of federal funding 
through the SFAG. (No state has ever been penalized in 
that way, however.) Related to that rule is an incentive for 
states to spend more than the MOE requirement: The 
federal government rewards each state that does so by 
reducing the number of families that must participate in 
work-related activities for the state to receive its full allot-
ment of federal funding.
MOE spending—that is, nonfederal spending that can be 
counted toward the MOE requirement—must be for ser-
vices that try to achieve one of TANF’s four goals. And 
for services that were not part of the programs that TANF 
replaced, only state spending in excess of 1995 levels 
can be included in MOE spending. A state can include 
spending by local governments and nongovernmental 
entities, such as private charities, that is directed at one of 
TANF’s goals; however, spending by nongovernmental 
entities accounted for only 2 percent of MOE spending 
in 2011.8 
6. An obligation is a legally binding commitment that will result in 
spending, immediately or in the future.
7. Marianne P. Bitler and Hilary W. Hoynes, “The State of the Social 
Safety Net in the Post–Welfare Reform Era,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity (Fall 2010), pp. 71–127, http://tinyurl.com/
kr82wtk; and Ron Haskins, Vicky Albert, and Kimberly Howard, 
The Responsiveness of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
Program During the Great Recession (Brookings Institution, 
August 2014), http://tinyurl.com/ppb9f8d.
8. CBO’s calculation to reach that figure was based on data from the 
Government Accountability Office, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families: More States Counting Third Party Maintenance of Effort 
Spending, GAO-12-929R (July 2012), www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-12-929R. Data about spending by local governments are 
not readily available.
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Figure 3.
Spending on TANF and the Programs That Preceded It, by Source of Funding, 1994 to 2013
Billions of 2013 Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: PRWORA replaced three programs—Aid to Families With Dependent Children, Emergency Assistance, and Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Training—with TANF.
This figure includes TANF funding that states transferred to the Child Care and Development Block Grant and to the Social Services 
Block Grant.
Because the available data are limited, the figure does not include three of the smaller federal funding mechanisms for TANF. In every 
year, those mechanisms have provided less than $0.3 billion in total.
Vertical bars indicate the duration of recessions.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; PRWORA = Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996.
a. Consists of spending that states count toward the maintenance-of-effort requirement—mostly spending by state and local governments, 
but also spending that private organizations direct to TANF objectives.
In the early years of TANF, the states’ documented MOE 
spending was about 20 percent lower than the amount 
that they had spent in 1995 on the programs that pre-
ceded TANF. That fact does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that the states’ actual TANF-related spending had 
fallen; some states simply did not report all of their 
spending, because documenting spending above the 
amount defined by the MOE requirement no longer enti-
tled a state to additional federal funding, as it had under 
AFDC. In fact, most of the states that the Government 
Accountability Office surveyed for a 2001 study had 
maintained or increased their spending on TANF-related 
services from 1995 to 2000. The study also found that 
the composition of states’ spending had changed once 
TANF was introduced. In particular, spending on 
cash assistance and training programs had declined 
substantially, while spending on health care for the 
working poor and other social services had increased.9
Through 2006, most states continued to report only 
enough spending to meet the MOE requirement, but 
after that, they began documenting more spending in 
response to three incentives. First, the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 (DRA) had imposed a more stringent work 
standard that took effect in 2007 (as this report explains 
in more detail in “The TANF Work Standard”), and sev-
eral states responded by spending more, which brought 
the required work participation rate in those states back 
down. Second, by 2009, enrollment in SNAP was high 
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9. Government Accountability Office, Welfare Reform: Challenges in 
Maintaining a Federal-State Fiscal Partnership, GAO-01-828 
(August 2001), www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-828.
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Figure 4.
Spending on TANF and the Programs That Preceded It, by Type of Assistance, 1994 to 2013
Billions of 2013 Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: Before PRWORA, Aid to Families With Dependent Children distributed recurring cash assistance, while the Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Training program provided work support and the Emergency Assistance program supplied other services for low-income 
families. Administration and systems costs are distributed proportionally among the three types of assistance.
This figure includes TANF funding that states transferred to the Child Care and Development Block Grant and to the Social Services 
Block Grant.
Because the available data are limited, the figure does not include three of the smaller federal funding mechanisms for TANF. In every 
year, those mechanisms have provided less than $0.3 billion in total.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; PRWORA = Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996.
enough that nearly all of the states could get additional 
federal support through the contingency fund—as long 
as they documented more MOE spending. Third, 
through the emergency contingency fund, the federal 
government encouraged the states to spend more in 2009 
and 2010 by reimbursing 80 percent of their increased 
spending on certain TANF services. After the emergency 
contingency fund expired, MOE spending declined to 
about $15 billion, where it remained through 2013.
By 2013, states were probably spending less on low-
income families through TANF than they would have if 
AFDC had never been replaced. The amount that states 
are required to spend on TANF to receive their full fed-
eral allotment has not increased since 1995, but the cost 
of living has risen substantially, and the number of fami-
lies in poverty has also grown. Under AFDC, the states 
would have had a greater incentive to increase aid to 
those families, because the federal government covered at 
least 50 percent of total spending on cash assistance and 
imposed no limit on that arrangement. In 1995, state and 
local governments provided about $3,200 per poor fam-
ily (in 2013 dollars); in 2013, they spent about $2,300, a 
30 percent decrease.
How the Spending Is Used
In 1996, the year before PRWORA was implemented, 
84 percent of the funding for the programs that preceded 
TANF was spent on AFDC, which provided recurring 
cash assistance. The other 16 percent was spent on the 
JOBS program, which supported recipients’ ability to 
work, and on the Emergency Assistance program, which 
provided short-term help, such as nonrecurring cash 
assistance (see Figure 4).10
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10. In this section of the report, spending on administration and 
systems, which accounted for less than 10 percent of TANF 
spending in most years, is distributed proportionally among cash 
assistance, work support, and other services. 
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Figure 5.
Recurring Cash Assistance Through TANF and AFDC, 1994 to 2013
2013 Dollars Millions of Families
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: Vertical bars indicate the duration of recessions.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; AFDC = Aid to Families With Dependent Children; PRWORA = Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
a. Data on the average monthly benefit are available only through 2012.
Then those three programs were replaced with TANF, 
which emphasized helping parents achieve self-sufficiency 
through employment and gave the states more discretion 
to choose services for low-income families. Spending 
subsequently fell for cash assistance and increased for 
work support and other TANF-funded services—which 
included initiatives to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnan-
cies, form two-parent families, and support the foster care 
system.11 By 2001, cash assistance accounted for only 
39 percent of total spending, work support accounted for 
36 percent, and other services accounted for 25 per-
cent—portions that remained roughly constant until 
2007. After DRA changed the MOE requirements and 
work standard in 2007, cash assistance declined further, 
while spending on work support remained stable and 
spending on other services grew to account for about a 
third of TANF funding.
Cash Assistance. The large decrease in inflation-adjusted 
spending on cash assistance can be explained by two 
changes: The number of recipients has declined substan-
tially, and so has the inflation-adjusted value of the aver-
age cash payment (see Figure 5).12 Those declines were 
sharper in some states than in others.
The Number of Recipients. Most of the decline in the 
number of cash assistance recipients occurred during the 
1990s; it began even before the implementation of 
PRWORA and accelerated after the transition to TANF 
in 1997. By 2000, just 2.2 million families received cash 
assistance, a 55 percent drop from the 1994 level of 
5.0 million. A major reason for the decline was that rising 
employment among single mothers helped pull many 
families out of poverty during the 1990s. That rise in 
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11. Unless this report specifies otherwise, cash assistance consists of 
recurring monthly benefits and does not include onetime cash 
payments, which are included in other assistance. In most years, 
TANF has provided less than $0.5 billion for onetime cash 
payments, though such funding was temporarily boosted by the 
emergency contingency fund. 
12. The decrease in cash assistance through TANF may overstate 
slightly the decrease in total cash assistance available to low-
income families. That is because some states have chosen to 
provide cash assistance to some families through other programs 
in order to avoid including those families in the calculation of 
whether the TANF work standard has been met. However, the 
amount spent on cash assistance through those programs is much 
smaller than the decrease in spending on cash assistance through 
TANF.
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employment, in turn, had three main causes: the rapid 
growth of the economy, which increased employment 
opportunities for workers with little education or work 
experience; the expansion of the earned income tax credit 
(EITC), which increased the compensation that those 
workers received for working and thus increased their 
incentive to work; and PRWORA and earlier reforms 
implemented by the states, which supported work (for 
example, by expanding subsidies for child care) and 
increased its appeal by requiring more recipients of cash 
assistance to work.13 However, the falling number of poor 
families during the 1990s accounted for only about 
60 percent of the decline in the number of families 
receiving cash assistance. During those years, a growing 
number of low-income families were neither receiving 
cash assistance nor working.14
After 2000, economic growth slowed and poverty 
increased. Specifically, from 2000 through 2008, the 
number of families with income below the official pov-
erty threshold increased by 24 percent. As poverty rose, so 
did the number of families with income low enough to 
qualify for TANF cash assistance.15 Nevertheless, the 
number of families receiving such cash assistance contin-
ued to decline, falling 28 percent from 2000 to 2008. 
Research suggests that the work requirements that states 
imposed on recipients played a substantial role in that 
decline: Some recipients did not meet the requirements 
and were therefore removed from the program, while the 
burden of meeting the requirements deterred others from 
applying in the first place.16
From 2008 to 2011, the number of families receiving 
cash assistance increased by 14 percent. That rise was 
roughly in line with the increase in poverty brought on by 
the 2007 recession. Since 2011, however, the number of 
families receiving cash assistance has declined more 
quickly than the number of poor families has.
All in all, the number of families receiving cash assistance 
through TANF or its predecessors fell by nearly 70 per-
cent between 1994 and 2013. By contrast, the number of 
families with income below the official poverty threshold 
was nearly as high in 2013 as in 1994. Thus, the ratio of 
cash assistance recipients to poor families also fell by 
about 70 percent during that period. By 2013, for every 
100 families in poverty, there were about 25 families 
receiving cash assistance (see Figure 6).
The ratio of cash assistance recipients to poor families is 
one basis for evaluating the effectiveness of TANF: A fall-
ing ratio could indicate that the program was not effec-
tively providing assistance to needy families, which is one 
of PRWORA’s stated goals. A problem with that basis, 
however, is that the Census Bureau, which makes the offi-
cial tally of poor families, does not count in that tally the 
noncash assistance and tax credits that those families 
receive as income—and a rising number of families were 
receiving those benefits during the years when the num-
ber of families receiving TANF cash assistance was falling. 
If the Census Bureau had included those benefits in its 
definition of income, the number of families counted as 
poor would have fallen by about 20 percent over the past 
20 years, CBO estimates. Still, even with that drop in the 
number of poor families, the ratio of cash assistance 
recipients to poor families has dipped substantially—by 
about 60 percent.17
13. Some research has concluded that the expansion of the EITC 
and the reforms implemented under PRWORA contributed more 
than the strength of the economy did to the decline in the number 
of families receiving cash assistance. See Jeffrey Grogger, “The 
Effects of Time Limits, the EITC, and Other Policy Changes 
on Welfare Use, Work, and Income Among Female-Headed 
Families,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 85, no. 2 
(May 2003), pp. 394–408, http://tinyurl.com/mdle36b (PDF, 
97 KB); and Jeffrey Grogger, “Welfare Transitions in the 1990s: 
The Economy, Welfare Policy, and the EITC,” Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, vol. 23, no. 4 (Autumn 2004), 
pp. 671–695, http://tinyurl.com/mh8zs7m. Other research has 
argued that estimates of the relative importance of those three 
factors could be inaccurate, because the effects of the policy 
changes were probably reinforced by the strong economy. See 
Rebecca M. Blank, “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United 
States,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 40, no. 4 (December 
2002), pp. 1105–1166, http://tinyurl.com/luwront.
14. Pamela Loprest, Disconnected Families and TANF (Urban 
Institute, November 2011), www.urban.org/publications/
412568.html.
15. See Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Office of Human 
Services Policy, Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors: Thirteenth 
Report to Congress (2014), p. II-18, http://go.usa.gov/pQYd 
(PDF, 2.1 MB).
16. Government Accountability Office, Fewer Eligible Families Have 
Received Cash Assistance Since the 1990s, and the Recession’s Impact 
on Caseloads Varies by State, GAO-10-164 (February 2010), 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-164.
17. For more detail, see Department of Health and Human Services, 
Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors: Thirteenth Report to Congress 
(2014), p. III-9, http://go.usa.gov/pQYd (PDF, 2.1 MB).
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Figure 6.
Coverage Ratios for Recurring Cash Assistance Through TANF and AFDC, 1994 to 2013
Number of Families Receiving Cash Assistance
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Census Bureau.
Notes: Because a small portion of cash assistance recipients have income above the poverty threshold, the lower line does not represent the 
percentage of poor families that receive cash assistance. Similarly, the upper line does not represent the percentage of unemployed 
families that receive cash assistance.
Vertical bars indicate the duration of recessions.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; AFDC = Aid to Families With Dependent Children; PRWORA = Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
a. A family is classified as unemployed if it is headed by an unemployed parent.
Another basis for evaluating the effectiveness of TANF is 
the ratio of cash assistance recipients to families headed 
by an unemployed parent. Over the past 20 years, that 
ratio has also fallen considerably, from nearly 300 recipi-
ents per 100 families headed by an unemployed parent to 
roughly 70 recipients per 100 families. Because tallies of 
unemployed parents, unlike poverty counts, exclude 
adults who are neither employed nor looking for work, 
the ratio’s decline was a sign that TANF was serving 
fewer families headed by a parent who was not in the 
labor force—which could be viewed as consistent with 
PRWORA’s stated goal of ending dependence on govern-
ment benefits by promoting work. However, the count of 
unemployed parents might overstate—or understate—
the number of families that some policymakers might 
want to receive benefits. On the one hand, the count of 
unemployed parents includes people who are ineligible 
for TANF because they have substantial assets or are 
receiving payments through unemployment insurance. 
On the other hand, the count excludes workers with low 
earnings and some people who are not currently looking 
for work (and are therefore not classified as unemployed) 
but who could probably find a job if they had access to 
the work support services provided to recipients of cash 
assistance.
The Value of the Average Payment. The value of the average 
monthly payment that families received through cash 
assistance remained roughly constant in nominal dollars 
from 1994 through 2012. When adjusted for inflation, 
the value of that payment declined by 30 percent, from 
about $540 to about $380 in 2013 dollars. The size of 
the payment that a family receives depends on its income 
and on benefit levels set by the states—and many states 
have not adjusted benefit levels to keep pace with infla-
tion, in part because federal funding has not increased 
with inflation, making such adjustments more difficult to 
finance. The size of a family’s payment also depends on 
the number of family members who qualify for benefits, 
which has fallen.
Differences Among the States. Spending on cash assistance 
varies substantially among the states. In the 10 states 
where spending on cash assistance per poor family was 
highest in 2012, federal and state spending for that pur-
pose equaled about $2,700 per poor family, compared 
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Figure 7.
Spending on Recurring Cash Assistance Through TANF, by State, 2012
2013 Dollars per Family Below the Poverty Threshold
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: To divide the 50 states and the District of Columbia into five groups (or quintiles), this chart includes 11 states in the middle quintile.
Neither the definition of poverty nor the spending amounts are adjusted for differences among the states in the cost of living. If they 
were, the differences in spending between the quintiles would generally be smaller, because the states in the lower quintiles typically 
have lower costs of living.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
with roughly $200 in the 10 states where spending per 
poor family was lowest. The variation is largely attribut-
able to disparities in how much states spent on TANF’s 
predecessors in the early 1990s, which PRWORA set as 
the basis for determining the states’ allocations of SFAG 
spending and their MOE requirements. However, the 
variation has since been amplified, because states with less 
TANF funding have generally allocated a smaller portion 
of that funding to cash assistance. Also, most of the states 
that spend the least on cash assistance per poor family are 
in the South (see Figure 7), whose population has grown 
more rapidly than the rest of the country’s since the allo-
cation of SFAG funding was established; that population 
growth means that less cash is available for each poor 
family.
The 10 states that spent the least on cash assistance per 
poor family typically aided a smaller percentage of those 
families. For every 100 poor families in those states, 
about 7 families received cash assistance, compared with 
48 families in the 10 states that spent the most. The states 
that spent the least also provided lower payments per 
family receiving cash assistance—about $210 per month, 
on average, or roughly one-sixth of the federal poverty 
threshold for a family of two, compared with $470 per 
month in the states that spent the most. Under both 
TANF and AFDC, most of the states that spent the least 
have provided cash assistance only to families with 
income far below the federal poverty threshold—perhaps 
partly because those states’ costs of living are below 
average.
Average Amount of
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Figure 8.
Spending on TANF for Work Support, 1998 to 2013
Billions of 2013 Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: Before 1998, the federal government and the states funded work support through the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training 
program and other programs. CBO has not compiled comprehensive data about those programs.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
a. Includes TANF funding that states transferred to the Child Care and Development Block Grant.
Work Support. Spending on initiatives that aimed to 
increase parents’ ability to work rose from $5.1 billion in 
1998 to $12.7 billion in 2000 (in 2013 dollars), a rise 
that was largely driven by increased spending on child 
care (see Figure 8). Since then, spending on work support 
has remained around $11 billion, except for a temporary 
boost in 2010 from the emergency contingency fund. 
CBO has grouped the work support funded through 
TANF into four categories:
 Child care. In recent years, about half of the funding 
for work support has subsidized child care to help 
parents work, train, or search for a job.
 Work preparation. Such services include helping 
parents search for jobs or giving them work experience 
by paying businesses to employ them. Until 2012, 
work preparation received the second-most funding.
 Refundable tax credits from states. Just as the federal 
government does in its own tax system, some states 
provide tax credits that are refundable. That is, if 
the amount of the credit exceeds a filer’s other state 
income tax liability, the state pays the excess to the 
filer. Many states have a refundable earned income 
tax credit, for example, which boosts the income of 
parents who work but have low earnings. TANF 
spending on tax credits surpassed TANF spending 
on work preparation in 2012. In that year, 21 states 
were counting part of their credits as MOE spending 
under TANF.
 Transportation. In most years, a small share of funding 
for work support has been spent on transportation 
services, such as subsidizing the commutes of low-
income parents.
Other Services. States may allocate TANF funding to ini-
tiatives other than cash assistance or work support if they 
serve TANF’s goals or were funded by the Emergency 
Assistance program that preceded TANF. A state may also 
transfer TANF funding to the Social Services Block 
Grant (SSBG) that it receives from the federal govern-
ment. Spending on initiatives other than cash assistance 
or work support rose from about $5.3 billion in 1998 to 
about $8.6 billion in 2002 (in 2013 dollars; see Figure 9). 
It began increasing again in 2007, after DRA allowed 
states to spend TANF funds on certain initiatives aimed 
at reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies and encouraging 
the formation of two-parent families without verifying 
that those initiatives were targeted at low-income 
families.
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Figure 9.
Spending on TANF for Services Other Than Recurring Cash Assistance or 
Work Support, 1998 to 2013
Billions of 2013 Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: States can spend TANF funding on initiatives for low-income families that are directed at any of the goals established in the statute 
that created TANF. Such initiatives include efforts to affect family structure (such as those intended to prevent out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies and encourage the formation of two-parent families) and the provision of short-term benefits (such as food, clothing, or 
cash provided on a nonrecurring basis). In addition to directing funding at TANF's goals, the states can spend TANF funding on services 
that were formerly covered by the Emergency Assistance program and can transfer TANF funding to the SSBG, which supports a wide 
variety of social services.
CBO has not compiled comprehensive data about the Emergency Assistance program and about the other programs that provided 
these services before 1998.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; SSBG = Social Services Block Grant.
 Initiatives serving TANF’s goals. States can spend 
federal or state TANF funds on any service that aims 
to achieve at least one of the four goals enumerated in 
PRWORA. States have spent about $8 billion per year 
on such services recently (not counting what they have 
spent on cash assistance and work support). About 
40 percent of that spending went to efforts related to 
family structure—that is, efforts to prevent out-of-
wedlock pregnancies and to encourage the formation 
of two-parent families—and to the provision of short-
term benefits, such as nonrecurring cash payments. 
The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has not usually required states to supply 
information on the services funded by the other 
60 percent of the spending.
 Services covered by prior law. States can spend TANF 
funds on a service not directed at one of PRWORA’s 
four goals if that service was provided by Emergency 
Assistance before PRWORA was enacted. TANF 
funding for such initiatives totaled $1.4 billion in 
2013 and supported foster care, adoption assistance, 
and other services for children, especially for abused 
and neglected children.
 Transfers to the Social Services Block Grant. Since 2011, 
states have transferred about $1.1 billion of federal 
TANF funding to the SSBG each year. The services 
provided through that grant include child protective 
services, services for the disabled, and subsidized child 
care.
The states differ substantially in the portion of TANF 
spending that they allocate to services other than cash 
assistance and work support. In 2013, in the 10 states 
that allocated the smallest portions of their TANF
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Figure 10.
States’ Allocations of TANF Funding, by Their Spending on Services Other Than Recurring 
Cash Assistance and Work Support, 2013
Percentage of TANF Spending
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: To divide the 50 states and the District of Columbia into five groups (or quintiles), this chart includes 11 states in the middle quintile.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
spending to those other services, the portion averaged 
about 15 percent—in contrast to 75 percent in the 10 
states that allocated the largest portions of their TANF 
spending to other services (see Figure 10).
The federal government requires the states to report the 
characteristics of cash assistance recipients and their prog-
ress toward self-sufficiency, but few statistics are collected 
for recipients of other TANF-funded services. Therefore, 
little information is available about the number of fami-
lies receiving those services or the extent to which the 
services meet TANF’s objectives.18
TANF and Other Federal Programs for 
Low-Income Families
TANF is not the only program that provides assistance to 
low-income families; the federal government funds doz-
ens of others, which help families obtain health care, 
food, education, and housing, among other things. The 
federal government also makes cash payments to low-
income families through SSI and refundable tax credits.
How TANF Compares With Other 
Federal Programs for Low-Income Families
TANF spending is only a small piece of the federal gov-
ernment’s total spending on programs for low-income 
families. While inflation-adjusted spending on AFDC 
and then on TANF has shrunk over the past 20 years, 
spending on many other means-tested programs and tax 
credits has increased substantially (see Figure 11).19 In 
2013, TANF accounted for less than 3 percent of federal 
spending on means-tested programs and tax credits for 
low-income families.
Moreover, only about 3 percent of federal means-tested 
cash assistance was given through TANF in 2013. SSI 
provided 12 times as much cash to low-income families as 
TANF did in that year, and the refundable earned income 
and child tax credits distributed 19 times as much. But
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18. See Government Accountability Office, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families: More Accountability Needed to Reflect Breadth of 
Block Grant Services, GAO-13-33 (December 2012), 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-33.
19. See Congressional Budget Office, Growth in Means-Tested 
Programs and Tax Credits for Low-Income Households 
(February 2013), www.cbo.gov/publication/43934.
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Figure 11.
Federal Spending on Selected Means-Tested Programs and Tax Credits, 1994 to 2013
Billions of 2013 Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
a. Before 1997, shows spending on Aid to Families With Dependent Children.
b. Includes nonrecurring cash assistance, which amounted to less than $0.5 billion in most years. Before 1997, shows spending on the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program and the Emergency Assistance program.
c. Consists of Medicaid and the low-income subsidy for Part D of Medicare, which provides prescription drug coverage.
d. Consists of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; child nutrition programs; the Federal Pell Grant Program; and a collection of 
housing programs, including Section 8 housing vouchers and public housing.
e. Consists of the refundable portions of the earned income tax credit and the child tax credit. 
eligibility for SSI is limited to the elderly and to younger 
people with qualifying disabilities, and the tax credits are 
available only to families with earnings.20
Recipients of TANF Cash Assistance and 
Assistance From Other Federal Programs
Most families receiving cash assistance through TANF 
have low enough income to qualify for subsidized 
health care and nutrition assistance from the federal 
government. In 2012, about 98 percent of the families 
receiving TANF cash assistance also received health care 
assistance, especially through Medicaid, which provides 
health care to people with low income and few assets (see 
Figure 12). About 85 percent of the families that received 
cash assistance also received funds to purchase food 
through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(formerly known as food stamps). In 2009, the latest year 
for which data are available, roughly 72 percent of fami-
lies receiving TANF cash assistance had children who 
received free or reduced-price school meals, and about 
44 percent received food through the Special Supplemen-
tal Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
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20. See Congressional Budget Office, Supplemental Security Income: 
An Overview (December 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43759, 
and Refundable Tax Credits (January 2013), www.cbo.gov/
publication/43767.
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Figure 12.
Participation in Other Means-Tested Programs by Families Receiving Recurring Cash Assistance 
Through TANF
Percentage of Families
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services and from the Census Bureau.
Notes: Most of the percentages are based on data from 2012, but for school meals, WIC, and SSI, the most recent readily available data cover 
2009.
Health care assistance is typically provided through Medicaid or the Children's Health Insurance Program. Free and reduced-price 
school meals are provided through the National School Lunch Program and the School Breakfast Program. Participation in the earned 
income and child tax credits is approximated by the percentage of families that had earnings and received cash assistance through 
TANF in the same month. In some cases, child care assistance is provided through TANF. TANF participants may also receive benefits 
from low-income assistance programs not included in this list.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; WIC = Special Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children; SSI = Supplemental Security Income; EITC = earned income tax credit.
(WIC).21 However, the income of most TANF cash assis-
tance families—including not only the cash assistance but 
also nutrition assistance and earnings—remained below 
the poverty threshold.22
Many fewer cash assistance families receive benefits 
through other federal programs. For example, most states 
do not allow people to receive cash assistance through 
both SSI and TANF. However, the elderly or disabled 
members of a low-income family may participate in SSI 
while other members of the same family participate in 
TANF. In 2009, about 21 percent of families receiving 
cash assistance through TANF also received monthly cash 
payments through SSI. Also, people can receive cash 
through both TANF and the earned income tax credit or 
child tax credit. But to receive the credits, a family must 
have earnings (in excess of $3,000 per year, in the case of 
the child tax credit), and only about 12 percent of fami-
lies receiving TANF cash assistance had earnings in an 
average month during 2012.
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21. Because HHS does not publish participation rates of TANF 
recipients in WIC, SSI, or free or reduced-price school meals, 
the rates for those programs are based on data from Shelley K. 
Irving, Comparing Program Participation of TANF and Non-TANF 
Families Before and During a Time of Recession, Current Population 
Reports P70-127 (Census Bureau, November 2011), 
http://go.usa.gov/pQQF.
22. For example, the average two-recipient family participating in 
TANF received about $900 in TANF cash assistance, nutrition 
assistance, and earnings in 2012, 70 percent of the poverty 
threshold for such a family. The National Academy of Sciences 
recommends excluding health benefits from such calculations of 
income because the poverty threshold does not adequately 
account for medical needs. See Constance F. Citro and Robert T. 
Michael, eds., Measuring Poverty: A New Approach (National 
Academy Press, 1995), http://go.usa.gov/my5h. 
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The federal government also provides housing assistance 
(for example, through Section 8 housing vouchers) and 
child care assistance (for example, through the Child 
Care and Development Fund and TANF) to some 
low-income families. However, the housing assistance 
programs serve only a small portion of all low-income 
families, which helps explain why only about 12 percent 
of families receiving TANF cash assistance in 2012 
received housing assistance as well. And just 7 percent of 
families receiving TANF cash assistance also obtained 
child care assistance—in large part because that assistance 
is focused on families with working parents, and most 
families that receive cash assistance do not include 
working parents.
The benefits that a family receives from one means-tested 
program can reduce the benefits available to that family 
from other means-tested programs. For instance, SNAP 
and some housing assistance programs reduce the benefits 
that they provide as families’ income—including TANF 
cash assistance—rises. SNAP benefits typically fall by 
30 cents for each dollar of cash assistance that a family 
receives from TANF. Similarly, some states reduce the 
cash assistance that a family receives from TANF if 
the family also receives assistance from SNAP, housing 
assistance programs, or tax credits.
The TANF Work Standard
The work standard is intended to limit ongoing depen-
dence on TANF cash assistance. It involves a state’s work 
participation rate, which is the percentage of families get-
ting cash assistance that include an adult “engaged in 
work” (that is, participating in qualifying work-related 
activities for a sufficient number of hours per week). A 
state risks losing some of its TANF funding if it does not 
demonstrate to HHS that its work participation rate is at 
least 50 percent. The states are therefore responsible for 
implementing policies that result in meeting that general 
work standard. For example, they help recipients search 
for employment, and they encourage recipients to partici-
pate in work-related activities by reducing their benefits if 
they do not. In addition to the general work standard, 
states that elect to provide TANF cash assistance to 
two-parent families are required to demonstrate that 
90 percent of them include an adult participating in 
work-related activities.23
In practice, few states can say that 50 percent of families 
getting cash assistance are engaged in work; indeed, the 
national average is roughly one-sixth (see Figure 13). 
Nevertheless, the states have seldom lost federal funding, 
for three reasons: 
 PRWORA allows states to exclude many nonworking 
families from the calculation of the work participation 
rate.
 The required work participation rate is actually much 
lower than 50 percent for most states; the law reduces 
it to reward the states for shrinking their caseloads 
(that is, the number of recipients of cash assistance) 
and for spending more on TANF. 
 Even states that do not meet their required work 
participation rates can avoid losing funds by taking 
corrective action.
It is often difficult for states to raise the share of families 
engaged in work. The adults in families receiving TANF 
cash assistance tend to have less education than average, 
and many have other barriers to employment, such as 
health problems.
The Work Participation Rate
Of families receiving TANF cash assistance that were 
included in the calculation of the work participation rate, 
roughly a third, in each year from 1998 through 2006, 
were engaged in work. The work participation rate was 
therefore about 33 percent. It fell a few percentage points 
in 2007 because many of the families that DRA had 
added to the calculation of the rate did not have enough 
hours of work participation to count as engaged in work. 
The rate remained near 30 percent through 2011. 
A recipient of cash assistance usually counts as engaged in 
work if he or she performs the work-related activities 
specified in PRWORA for an average of at least 30 hours 
a week. Only 20 hours a week are required for single par-
ents with children younger than six, and 55 hours a week 
are required for two-parent families receiving subsidized 
child care. CBO has grouped those work-related activities 
into four categories:
23. However, two-parent families have consistently accounted for less 
than 6 percent of cash assistance recipients in TANF. This report 
therefore focuses on the general work standard, which applies to 
the combination of one- and two-parent families.
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Figure 13.
Work Participation Status and Activities of Families Receiving Recurring Cash Assistance 
Through TANF, 1998 to 2011
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Notes: Under TANF's work standard, a state risks losing some of its federal funding if a sufficient percentage of its families are not engaged in 
qualifying work-related activities for a sufficient number of hours. However, many families are excluded from the calculation of that 
work participation rate. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 tightened the work standard, beginning in 2007.
As of the end of 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services had not published data about work participation for 2012 or 
2013. 
Workfare refers to giving families TANF cash assistance in return for work, such as community service, that they would otherwise not 
be paid for.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
 Unsubsidized employment. The most common 
activity that lets adults count as engaged in work is 
conventional employment.
 Workfare and subsidized employment. Workfare refers 
to giving families TANF cash assistance in return for 
work, such as community service, that they would 
otherwise not be paid for; the recipients are intended 
to gain experience that can improve their chances of 
finding conventional employment. Similarly, 
recipients can gain experience through subsidized 
employment, in which the government bears at least 
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part of the cost of the recipients’ wages and other 
payroll expenses in a conventional job. Subsidized 
employment is far less common than workfare.
 Job search and readiness. Recipients can usually count 
as engaged in work if they are looking for work or 
participating in job readiness activities, which include 
substance abuse treatment and training in basic life 
skills. However, they can do so for no more than six 
weeks per year. That limit rises to 12 weeks if a state’s 
unemployment rate exceeds certain levels established 
in PRWORA. The limit also rises to 12 weeks if a 
state’s rate of participation in SNAP exceeds certain 
levels—which was the case in all 50 states in 2013.
 Education and training. Education and training related 
to a particular occupation or job can allow recipients 
to count as engaged in work; so can completing high 
school. Recipients engaged in vocational education, 
which is the most common activity in this category, 
can meet the work requirement through it for only 
12 months. Recipients engaged in another kind of 
education or training in this category must combine it 
with other qualifying work activities if they are older 
than 19. 
Conventional, unsubsidized employment has consistently 
been the most common work-related activity of adults in 
cash assistance families who are engaged in work. It 
accounted for 63 percent of those adults’ work activities 
in 1998 (see the bottom panel of Figure 13). Over the 
next eight years, the number of adults in unsubsidized 
employment declined, while the number in other 
work activities held fairly constant. As a consequence, 
unsubsidized employment accounted for only 46 percent 
of participation by 2006. HHS then narrowed the range 
of activities other than unsubsidized employment that 
could be counted as engagement in work, and the portion 
of participation held by unsubsidized employment rose to 
65 percent in 2008. However, by 2011, it had fallen 
to 44 percent. Most of that decline was because of an 
increase in the number of adults participating in job 
search activities, vocational education, and workfare; but 
a drop in the number of adults engaged in unsubsidized 
employment, probably caused partly by the severe eco-
nomic downturn, was also a factor. From 2008 to 2011, 
the national unemployment rate rose from 5.3 percent to 
9.2 percent, and the states with higher unemployment 
rates were often the ones with smaller percentages of 
adult recipients engaged in unsubsidized employment.
Nearly all states require adults to begin participating in 
work-related activities immediately upon receipt of bene-
fits. The states assess each family’s appropriate path to 
self-sufficiency on the basis of its situation; place recipi-
ents in work-related activities; and help them find jobs. 
To encourage recipients to participate in work-related 
activities, all states reduce or terminate benefits for those 
who fail to do so. Many states have increased the extent 
to which they continue providing cash assistance to recip-
ients who have found work, a tactic that allows the states 
to continue counting those recipients in calculations of 
the work participation rate and also reduces the disincen-
tive to work that might otherwise confront recipients of 
cash assistance. States have also increased the work partic-
ipation rate by reducing the number of nonworking 
families that receive cash assistance through TANF. For 
example, some states have diverted applicants who face 
serious obstacles to employment to other cash assistance 
programs or given them onetime payments in lieu of 
recurring assistance.24
Exclusions From the Work Participation Rate
The most common reason for allowing a family to be 
excluded from the calculation of the work participation 
rate is that the children receiving cash assistance are being 
cared for not by their parents but by other relatives who 
are not recipients of cash assistance themselves. Parent-
headed families, too, are excluded from the calculation if 
the parents are ineligible for cash assistance, either 
because of immigrant status or because they receive bene-
fits through SSI. States can also exclude a single parent 
with an infant, but for a total of no more than 12 months 
over the course of the parent’s life. Even fewer of the 
excluded adults are employed than adults in TANF in 
general are, so their exclusion from the calculation of the 
work participation rate probably raises that rate.
The percentage of families receiving TANF cash assis-
tance nationwide that were included in the calculation of 
the work participation rate declined from 67 percent in 
1998 to 45 percent in 2006 (see the top panel of 
Figure 13). Then, in 2007, provisions of DRA restricted 
the conditions under which some families could be 
excluded from the rate and mandated the inclusion of 
others, and the percentage of families included in the rate 
24. For a more detailed discussion of states’ strategies for meeting the 
work standard, see Heather Hahn, David Kassabian, and Sheila 
Zedlewski, TANF Work Requirements and State Strategies to Fulfill 
Them (Urban Institute, March 2012), www.urban.org/
publications/412563.html.
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rose to about 50 percent that year, where it hovered 
through 2011.
How States Usually Meet the Work Standard
In most years, only about 10 states have reported work 
participation rates above the statutory 50 percent thresh-
old. Nevertheless, most of the states have met the general 
work standard—mainly by taking advantage of provisions 
in PRWORA that reduce a state’s required work partici-
pation rate if that state reduces its caseload or increases its 
spending. 
Shrinking the Caseload to Reduce the Required Work 
Participation Rate. From 1998 to 2006, if a state pro-
vided cash assistance to fewer families than it had in 
1995, the federal government gave that state a caseload 
reduction credit that lowered the work participation rate 
that the state had to meet. Specifically, the required work 
participation rate fell by 1 percentage point for each 
1 percent decline in the caseload from 1995. From 1995 
to 2011, 20 states saw their caseloads fall by more than 
50 percent, which voided the general work standard 
entirely. Even so, all states engaged some cash assistance 
recipients in work activities; in 2006, work participation 
rates ranged from 14 percent to 79 percent, with a 
median of 36 percent.
In 2005, however, DRA changed the year from which 
reductions in the number of cash assistance recipients 
were measured. Starting in 2007, that year would be not 
1995 but 2005. The change increased the required par-
ticipation rate by more than 25 percentage points in 
about half of the states. In 2007, 12 states failed to meet 
the newly tightened work standard. Of the states that did 
meet the standard, about half increased their work partic-
ipation rates by substantially reducing the number of 
families receiving TANF cash assistance—a step that also 
reduced the states’ required work participation rates by 
increasing the number of credits that they received for 
caseload reductions.
Using Spending Credits to Reduce the Required Work 
Participation Rate. Several other states that met the new 
work standard did so by taking advantage of another 
provision of PRWORA: They could receive credits that 
lowered their required work participation rates if they 
documented spending in excess of the maintenance-of-
effort requirement. Regulations stemming from DRA 
made that approach easier for states by allowing them to 
count spending on some programs aimed at preventing 
out-of-wedlock pregnancies and encouraging the forma-
tion of two-parent families, regardless of whether that 
spending was directed at low-income families.
How States Limit Penalties for Not Meeting the 
Work Standard
After 2007, violations of the work standard continued; 
several states failed to meet it in each year from 2008 
through 2011. HHS is in the process of determining the 
funding penalties for those violations. Before 2007, 
nearly all violations were of the work standard for two-
parent families, whereas many of the violations since then 
have been violations of the general work standard. The 
more recent violations could carry larger penalties, 
because the general work standard applies to far more 
recipients than the one for two-parent families does. 
However, states have taken a variety of measures that 
could reduce or negate the penalties—for example, agree-
ing to a “corrective compliance plan” in which a state 
promises to meet the work standard in the future.25
Challenges for States in Meeting the Work Standard
States face a number of challenges in meeting the work 
standard. Less educated workers—a group that includes 
most recipients of TANF cash assistance—often struggle 
to find employment. And that problem is even starker for 
recipients of TANF cash assistance.
The Employment of Less Educated Workers. Unemploy-
ment among workers with no more than a high school 
diploma was already high during the decades leading up 
to the recent recession. In 2007, the unemployment rate 
among those workers was 6.7 percent (considerably 
higher than the 4.5 percent among all workers), and an 
additional 11.3 percent of less educated workers were 
employed only part time—less than 30 hours a week. 
Labor market conditions for less educated workers 
became even worse during and after the recession, when 
weak demand for goods and services led to low demand 
for workers at all levels of education. By 2010, the 
unemployment rate for people with a high school 
diploma or less had grown to 13.9 percent, and another 
11.7 percent were working less than 30 hours a week. 
Similar conditions persisted in 2011, though they have 
abated somewhat since then.
25. For more detail on penalties for violations of the work standard, 
see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways 
and Means, Green Book (December 2011), Chapter 7, 
http://go.usa.gov/EzaA.
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Various factors may be responsible for persistently high 
rates of unemployment among less educated workers. 
Some research suggests that the federal minimum wage 
has prevented wages from falling to levels at which 
employers would have demanded more such workers.26 
Unemployment rates could also be higher among less 
educated workers because the lower wages available to 
them make working less attractive. In addition, means-
tested programs, such as SNAP and housing assistance, 
make working less attractive because the benefits they 
provide decline as earnings increase, and those programs 
disproportionately serve the families of less educated 
workers.27
High unemployment among less educated workers pres-
ents a challenge to states trying to meet the TANF 
work standard because almost all of the adults who are 
included in the calculation of the work participation rate 
have no more than a high school education. In fact, about 
40 percent never completed high school. Some evidence 
tying higher unemployment among less educated workers 
to low work participation rates is that the states with 
the former often have the latter as well. Those states also 
had higher unemployment rates among less educated 
adults who were not eligible for TANF, which suggests 
that the high unemployment rates were not driven by the 
program itself.
The Employment of TANF Recipients. Many recipients of 
TANF cash assistance have even more trouble finding 
and holding a job than less educated workers in general 
do. Only about 10 percent of adult TANF recipients were 
working 20 or more hours per week when they entered 
the program, and about a third of them were not looking 
for work. In many cases, barriers to employment—that is, 
conditions that are associated with low rates of employ-
ment—probably contribute to recipients’ not being 
engaged in work. For example, about 25 percent of adult 
TANF recipients report having a work-limiting physical 
condition. Less common barriers to employment include 
a lack of work experience, a criminal record, a disabled 
child who must be cared for, poor mental health, and 
drug abuse.28
Options for Changing TANF
CBO has assessed 12 options that illustrate a variety of 
approaches to changing TANF. Five of the options would 
change the program’s funding, five would change the 
work standard, and two would change the MOE require-
ment. CBO has evaluated the options’ effects in four 
areas:
 Federal spending. Only two of the options—one that 
reduces the SFAG, and one that increases it—would 
be likely to have a substantial effect on federal 
spending and hence on the deficit.29
 Access to assistance. Most of the options would change 
the number of low-income families that received cash 
or other assistance through TANF. Also, some of the 
options would shift funding to times or locations with 
more unemployment and poverty. Such shifts could 
make cash assistance more available to the families 
with the lowest income by reducing the budgetary 
pressure on states to tighten eligibility requirements 
during periods when the greatest need existed.
 Duration of assistance. Most of the options could 
affect the average number of months during which 
participants received cash assistance over the course of 
their lives.30 An option would be consistent with the 
goals stated in PRWORA if it reduced the average 
duration of assistance by helping families find 
employment more quickly. But some ways of reducing 
the average duration of assistance—for example,
26. For a review of research on how the minimum wage affects 
employment, see Congressional Budget Office, The Effects of a 
Minimum-Wage Increase on Employment and Family Income 
(February 2014), www.cbo.gov/publication/44995.
27. For a description of the extent to which means-tested benefits 
decline as earnings increase, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Low- and Moderate-Income Workers 
(November 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43709.
28. Pamela Loprest and Sheila Zedlewski, The Changing Role of 
Welfare in the Lives of Low-Income Families With Children, 
Occasional Paper 73 (Urban Institute, August 2006), pp. 26–34, 
www.urban.org/publications/311357.html; and Susan Hauan and 
Sarah Douglas, Potential Employment Liabilities Among TANF 
Recipients: A Synthesis of Data From Six State TANF Caseload 
Studies (Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, October 2004), 
http://go.usa.gov/EFNd.
29. Authorization for TANF expires on September 30, 2015, but by 
law, CBO’s baseline budget projections incorporate the 
assumption that the program will be extended at current funding 
levels, which would lead to about $170 billion of federal spending 
on TANF from 2016 through 2025.
30. In calculating the duration of assistance, CBO excluded families 
that were exempt from the five-year limit on cash assistance.
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Table 2.
Effects of Options That Change TANF Funding
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: These options would have little effect on the flexibility that states have in administering TANF.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; SFAG = state family assistance grant.
a. This column shows changes in budget authority, which could differ from changes in outlays if states changed the amount of funding that 
they saved. At current funding levels, the federal government would obligate about $170 billion to TANF from 2016 through 2025.
b. In this report, access to assistance is measured by the number of families receiving assistance and by the extent to which assistance is 
targeted at the families with the lowest income.
c. In this report, the duration of assistance is measured by the average number of months during which recipients get cash assistance over 
the course of their lives.
diverting to other programs applicants who were 
unlikely to meet work requirements quickly, an 
approach that states have sometimes taken—might 
not help families find employment more quickly.31
 Flexibility for the states. PRWORA also emphasized 
giving the states more flexibility to tailor aid to their 
residents’ needs and to experiment with policies that 
might increase the effectiveness of TANF.32 However, 
that flexibility entails the risk that some of the 
experiments will not be consistent with federal 
objectives.
Option
Federal 
Spending, 
2016–2025a Access to Assistanceb Duration of Assistancec
Option 1: Reduce the SFAG by 10 Percent $16 billion lower There would be modest 
reductions in access, even when 
it was needed most.
The effect would depend on 
which services states chose to 
cut most.
Option 2: Increase the SFAG to Account for 
Inflation
$22 billion higher Access would be sustained more 
over time.
The effect would depend on 
which services states chose to 
expand most.
Option 3: Link the SFAG to the 
Unemployment Rate
Negligible effect Access would increase 
substantially when it was needed 
more and decrease substantially 
when it was needed less.
There would probably be a 
reduction in the number of 
families receiving cash 
assistance for long periods.
Option 4: Make the Contingency Fund 
More Responsive to High Unemployment
Negligible effect More federal funding would be 
provided to states with more 
unemployment, but less would 
be provided to states that spent 
more of their own funds on TANF.
There would probably be a 
reduction in the number of 
families receiving cash 
assistance for long periods.
Option 5: Reinstate Supplemental Grants 
but Reduce the Contingency Fund
Negligible effect More federal funding would be 
provided to states with more 
poverty, but less would be 
provided to states that spent 
more of their own funds on TANF.
Funding would be less targeted 
at states where families typically 
received cash assistance for 
longer periods.
31. Heather Hahn, David Kassabian, and Sheila Zedlewski, TANF 
Work Requirements and State Strategies to Fulfill Them (Urban 
Institute, March 2012), www.urban.org/publications/
412563.html.
32. The goals for TANF established in PRWORA also include 
reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 
promoting the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. 
However, the body of research on TANF’s performance in 
achieving those objectives is largely inconclusive. For a review of 
that research, see Jacob Alex Klerman, “Family Structure,” in 
Jeffrey Grogger and Lynn A. Karoly, eds., Welfare Reform: Effects of 
a Decade of Change (Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 173–
198, http://tinyurl.com/pkuxq4y.
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Options That Change Funding
CBO has assessed five options that would change funding 
for TANF. Two of them would affect total federal spend-
ing over the next 10 years, either by reducing the SFAG 
or by increasing it (see Table 2). The remaining three 
options would shift funding but have little effect on total 
federal spending. The option that reduced the SFAG 
would provide services to fewer low-income families, and 
the one that increased it would provide them to more 
families. None of the five options would have much effect 
on the states’ flexibility in administering TANF.
Changes in funding could either increase or reduce the 
average number of months during which participants 
received cash assistance, depending on how states distrib-
uted the funding among TANF services. For example, if 
the SFAG was increased, some states would probably 
boost funding for cash assistance, which would probably 
lead to families’ receiving it for longer periods. However, 
states would also be likely to increase funding for job 
search activities, which would probably reduce the aver-
age duration of cash assistance. Which of those effects 
would dominate is unclear.
Option 1: Reduce the State Family Assistance Grant by 
10 Percent. This option would reduce the funding 
available to each state through the SFAG by 10 percent, 
saving about $16 billion over 10 years. Thus, access to 
assistance would be reduced, by a modest amount, even 
when the unemployment rate was high.
Option 2: Increase the State Family Assistance Grant to 
Account for Inflation. Under this option, the amount of 
funding that each state received through the SFAG in the 
future would be linked to the consumer price index—the 
same index that other means-tested programs and Social 
Security use to adjust their benefits to account for the ris-
ing cost of living. Indexing the SFAG by means of the 
consumer price index would cost about $0.3 billion in 
2016, and the cost would grow to roughly $4.2 billion by 
2025, for a total of $22 billion over 10 years. The states 
could use that additional funding to keep the number of 
low-income families that they assisted from falling.
Option 3: Link the State Family Assistance Grant to the 
Unemployment Rate. To provide more cash assistance 
during periods when it was needed more, this option 
would increase a state’s funding through the SFAG by 
20 percent when that state’s unemployment rate was 
above 6.5 percent and by 30 percent when the rate was 
above 8 percent. To offset the cost of doing so, the option 
would also reduce a state’s funding through the SFAG 
by 20 percent when its unemployment rate was below 
5 percent and by 30 percent when the rate was below 
4 percent. After studying differences in unemployment 
rates among states and consulting its forecast of the 
national unemployment rate, CBO concluded that this 
option would probably have little effect on total federal 
spending over the next 10 years.33
The option would provide a substantial boost in funding 
during periods of high unemployment. If it had been in 
effect during 2009 and 2010, when the national unem-
ployment rate peaked at 10 percent, it would have 
increased funding in 47 states by a total of $8.5 billion. 
Increasing funding during periods of high unemploy-
ment would be less likely to deter employment than 
many other approaches to increasing funding would be—
because during periods of high unemployment, fewer 
recipients would otherwise have been able to find work.
In contrast, if the option had been in effect in 2014, 
when unemployment rates in some parts of the country 
had declined substantially, nine states would have 
received at least 20 percent less in SFAG funding than 
they did—although those cuts would have been smaller 
than the increases in states with high unemployment in 
that year. The number of states getting less funding 
would grow as the economy continued to recover from 
the recent recession, CBO estimates, and with a suffi-
ciently strong recovery, funding nationwide would ulti-
mately fall below the amount that would occur under 
current law. 
Cutting funding during periods of low unemployment 
would probably reduce the number of families whose 
time on cash assistance lasted for several years, because 
some states, compensating for the funding cuts by trying 
to reduce the number of cash recipients, would tighten 
time limits or work requirements. A potential drawback 
of such funding cuts is that some TANF services are 
needed more when jobs are plentiful. For example, most 
subsidized child care is provided to parents with jobs, 
which suggests that demand for it is higher at times when 
many parents are able to find employment.
There are reasons to think that low-income families do 
not necessarily need TANF cash assistance more when 
33. CBO’s model is designed to forecast the number of states that 
would have high and low unemployment rates, but not which 
states those would be.
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the unemployment rate is high. First, that rate refers to 
the population in general, not to the less educated people 
who are TANF’s main beneficiaries. Second, as the unem-
ployment rate rises, more low-income families receive 
cash assistance through the unemployment insurance sys-
tem. However, the unemployment rate among less edu-
cated people and the rate of child poverty tend to rise and 
fall with the overall unemployment rate, which suggests 
that the unemployment rate is indeed indicative of the 
need for TANF cash assistance.34
Option 4: Make the Contingency Fund More Responsive 
to High Unemployment. A state with a high and rising 
unemployment rate can become eligible for the contin-
gency fund (as is explained above in “Spending on 
TANF”). In recent years, however, money from the con-
tingency fund has not been concentrated on the states 
with the highest unemployment rates, because a state can 
also qualify if the number of its residents participating in 
SNAP has increased by more than 10 percent since 1994 
or 1995—a criterion that every state met in 2013 because 
of population growth, the effects of the most recent reces-
sion, and efforts to increase the percentage of eligible 
families that enrolled in SNAP. The distribution of the 
contingency fund in 2013 was therefore determined 
solely by the third criterion for eligibility: state spending 
in excess of the MOE requirement.
This option would change the eligibility criteria in order 
to direct more of the contingency fund to states with high 
unemployment rates. The SNAP criterion would be elim-
inated, and a state’s unemployment rate would have to be 
only high, not rising, for the state to qualify for the con-
tingency fund. The option would also change the state 
spending requirement so that states had to increase their 
spending only on certain categories of services. Back 
when the emergency contingency fund existed, states 
could qualify for it by increasing spending on cash assis-
tance, short-term benefits, or subsidized employment, 
even if the sum of their spending on all TANF services 
remained unchanged. Allowing states to qualify for the 
contingency fund in the same way would increase the 
number of states with high unemployment that could use 
the fund; however, it would also remove an incentive for 
states to spend in excess of the MOE requirement. States 
with low unemployment rates could no longer qualify for 
the contingency fund by spending more of their own 
funds on TANF, even though such spending might reflect 
high demand for TANF services among their residents.
This option might reduce the average duration of TANF 
cash assistance. In recent years, the states that would have 
lost eligibility under this option have provided cash bene-
fits to adult recipients for several more weeks, on average, 
than other states have. Faced with reductions in funding 
under this option, some of those states would probably 
tighten work requirements or time limits. In addition, 
states that lost their funding would probably see that 
funding transferred to states where the average duration 
of assistance was lower, which might increase the percent-
age of recipients who got benefits for short periods.
Option 5: Reinstate Supplemental Grants but Reduce the 
Contingency Fund. Between 2001 and 2011, supple-
mental grants reduced differences in total TANF 
funding among the states by providing additional fund-
ing to those with low historic ratios of AFDC spending 
to people living in poverty (again, see “Spending on 
TANF”above). This option would reinstate the supple-
mental grants, providing $319 million in funding for 
them each year while reducing appropriations for the 
contingency fund by the same amount.
Unlike the two previous options, which link funding to 
unemployment rates, this option steers funding to states 
that would otherwise receive little of it. Part of the ratio-
nale is that SFAG funding per poor family varies much 
more from state to state than it does because of fluctua-
tions in the business cycle. In 2013, SFAG funding per 
poor family averaged about $4,800 in the 10 states where 
it was highest, more than five times the average in the 
10 states where it was lowest. By contrast, in 2007, 
when the unemployment rate was 4.5 percent, funding 
per poor family averaged about $2,800 nationwide, 
18 percent higher than the average in 2010, when the 
unemployment rate was 9.7 percent.
Shifting money from the contingency fund to supple-
mental grants would move funding toward states that 
have higher poverty rates and away from states that have 
more MOE spending. It would also shift funding toward 
states where families’ average length of time on cash assis-
tance has been shorter. However, the option would also 
reduce states’ incentives to fund TANF, because the sup-
plemental grants would not require states to spend in 
34. The unemployment and child poverty rates are charted in Gene 
Falk, The Potential Role of the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) Block Grant in the Recession, Report for Congress 
R40157 (Congressional Research Service, September 2009), p. 4.
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excess of the MOE requirement, as the contingency fund 
does. The option could also reduce the amount of cash 
assistance and work support funded through TANF, 
because the states that would be eligible for supplemental 
grants have traditionally allocated a smaller portion of 
their TANF funding to those services. If lawmakers 
wanted to counter that trend, they could require those 
states to increase spending on cash assistance and work 
support as a condition for receiving the supplemental 
grants.
Options That Change the Work Standard
CBO has assessed five policy options that would change 
the TANF work standard. The first would prevent states 
from applying for waivers from the standard. The rest 
would change the work standard itself—by replacing the 
caseload reduction credit, by eliminating the credits for 
spending in excess of the MOE requirement, or by allow-
ing certain activities to qualify as work-related for longer.
These five options would probably not affect federal 
spending significantly. It is true that when a state violates 
the work standard, it risks forfeiting some of its federal 
funding, in which case federal spending would fall by the 
amount of the penalty. But the penalties have been small 
to date—the largest has amounted to $0.2 million—and 
these options would not change how the size of the penal-
ties was calculated. However, the options could affect 
states’ flexibility to provide the services that they believe 
are best suited for their residents.
Option 6: Prohibit States From Using Different Work 
Standards. In 2012, HHS encouraged states to apply for 
waivers from the work standard so that they could try 
other approaches to promoting stable employment for 
needy families.35 That initiative arose as some policy-
makers were voicing concern that the work standard was 
failing to help many low-income families become self-
sufficient.36 Other policymakers, however, view the large 
decline in the number of cash assistance recipients as an 
indication that the work standard has substantially 
reduced dependence on government assistance, and they 
have expressed concern that waiving the standard could 
reverse some of that change. As of mid-December 2014, 
no state had applied for a waiver.
This option would prevent HHS from waiving the cur-
rent work standard for a state. It would thus prevent 
states from experimenting with work standards that 
might be able to outperform the current one by better 
promoting self-sufficiency or serving a larger percentage 
of poor families, and it would prevent states from 
diminishing work standards in ways that might increase 
dependency.
The option could reduce recipients’ access to cash assis-
tance, because states might meet the current work stan-
dard by providing cash assistance to fewer families than 
they would under their own work standards (see Table 3). 
Further, if states achieved such reductions by making 
time limits shorter than they would have under their own 
work standards, or by imposing more penalties on non-
working recipients, the option would probably reduce the 
average duration of cash assistance. However, no states 
have adopted their own work standards yet, and it is not 
clear whether any will.
Option 7: Credit States for Former Recipients’ Continued 
Employment, Not for Caseload Reductions. The caseload 
reduction credit lowers a state’s required work participa-
tion rate in proportion to reductions in the number of 
cash assistance recipients in that state since 2005. How-
ever, between 2005 and 2013, the number of families in 
poverty (as defined by the federal government) rose by 
about 15 percent. Faced with growing need, several states 
were unable to trim their caseloads and obtain the credit.
If this option was implemented, states would instead 
receive credits in proportion to the length of time that 
recipients remained employed after they stopped receiv-
ing cash assistance. With the caseload reduction credit, 
states can meet the work standard by denying families 
cash assistance instead of involving them in work-related 
activities. Removing that credit would reduce states’ 
incentive to deny families cash assistance. However, 
35. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration 
for Children and Families, Office of Family Assistance, 
“Guidance Concerning Waiver and Expenditure Authority 
Under Section 1115,” TANF-ACF-IM-2012-03 (March 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/mCWB.
36. About a third of former recipients report income below 50 percent 
of the poverty threshold shortly after leaving TANF. See Gregory 
Acs and Pamela Loprest, TANF Caseload Composition and Leavers 
Synthesis Report (submitted by the Urban Institute to the 
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for 
Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research, and 
Evaluation, March 2007), www.urban.org/publications/
411553.html.
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Table 3.
Effects of Options That Change the TANF Work Standard
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: These options would be unlikely to have a substantial effect on federal spending.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
a. In this report, access to assistance is measured by the number of families receiving assistance and by the extent to which assistance is 
targeted at the families with the lowest income.
b. In this report, the duration of assistance is measured by the average number of months during which recipients get cash assistance over 
the course of their lives.
c. The maintenance-of-effort requirement penalizes a state in which nonfederal spending on TANF is less than 75 percent of nonfederal 
spending in 1994 on the programs that preceded TANF.
several states rely on credits for caseload reductions to 
meet the work standard. If they could not get enough 
employment credits to meet the work standard, they 
could lose some federal funding, which would reduce the 
amount of assistance that they provided.
It is unclear how crediting states for the continued 
employment of former recipients would affect the average 
duration of cash assistance. On the one hand, some states 
would probably keep families in TANF longer in order to 
find them more stable employment. On the other hand, 
more stable employment would reduce the chances that 
the families needed assistance again in the future, and 
that would reduce the average duration of cash assistance.
An employment credit could more closely link a state’s 
ability to meet the work standard—and hence its federal 
funding—to local job market conditions. If that was the 
Option Access to Assistancea Duration of Assistanceb Flexibility for the States
Option 6: Prohibit States From 
Using Different Work Standards
States that are struggling to 
meet the current standard 
might shrink their caseloads.
States that are struggling to 
meet the current standard 
might reduce the duration of 
assistance.
States would not be able to 
implement work standards 
that accommodated local 
conditions.
Option 7: Credit States for Former 
Recipients' Continued 
Employment, Not for Caseload 
Reductions
Some states would probably 
increase the size of their 
caseloads if the number of 
credits that they received did 
not change.
Some recipients would 
probably receive benefits for 
longer periods, but others 
might be less likely to need 
assistance again in the future.
There would be little effect if 
the number of credits that 
states received did not 
change.
Option 8: Eliminate Credits for 
Spending in Excess of the 
Maintenance-of-Effort 
Requirementc
Some of the states that have 
used the credits to meet the 
work standard would probably 
shrink their caseloads.
Some of the states that have 
used the credits to meet the 
work standard would probably 
reduce the duration of 
assistance.
States would have fewer ways 
to meet the work standard.
Option 9: Loosen the Limit on 
Counting Job Readiness Activities 
as Engagement in Work
Some states would provide 
more aid to the people who 
were the least prepared for 
employment; services for 
others would probably be 
reduced.
Some states would probably 
increase the duration of 
assistance.
States would have more 
discretion to provide extensive 
job readiness services.
Option 10: Loosen the Limit on 
Counting Vocational Education as 
Engagement in Work
Some states would help more 
people earn postsecondary 
degrees; services for others 
would probably be reduced.
Some recipients would 
probably receive benefits for 
longer periods, but others 
might be less likely to need 
assistance again in the future.
States would have more 
discretion to provide extensive 
vocational education.
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case, such a credit would probably reduce the number of 
families that received assistance during periods when jobs 
were scarce, because the employment of former recipients 
would probably be less stable in those periods, leaving the 
states with fewer credits. Conversely, because former 
recipients would probably be more steadily employed 
during periods when jobs were abundant, an employ-
ment credit would probably allow states to provide cash 
assistance to families for longer during those periods, 
which would reduce the families’ incentive to find work 
at times when it was plentiful. Lawmakers could try to 
avoid that pitfall by providing more credits per month of 
continued employment when a state’s unemployment 
rate was high.
Option 8: Eliminate Credits for Spending in Excess of the 
Maintenance-of-Effort Requirement. From 2007 through 
2009, more than a dozen states met the work standard by 
using credits that they received for spending more than 
the MOE requirement, according to the Government 
Accountability Office.37 That approach probably 
remained prevalent in 2010 and 2011, when many of the 
states that had work participation rates below the statu-
tory requirement continued to spend in excess of the 
MOE requirement.
This option would eliminate the spending credits. If it 
was implemented, some states that had relied on those 
credits would probably meet the work standard by tight-
ening work requirements or shortening time limits for 
benefits. Such changes would probably reduce the num-
ber of families that depended on cash assistance for long 
periods, but they would probably also increase the num-
ber of families with no access to cash assistance, even for 
brief periods. Also, with the incentive for states to spend 
in excess of the MOE requirement gone, some states 
would probably reduce their spending on TANF, which 
would be likely to further reduce the services available to 
low-income families. (If lawmakers did not want states 
to reduce their spending on TANF, they could retain 
the spending credits but stop states from counting spend-
ing by nongovernmental organizations in their MOE 
spending—an option that is discussed below.)
Option 9: Loosen the Limit on Counting Job Readiness 
Activities as Engagement in Work. Under the current 
work standard, a cash assistance recipient’s participation 
in job readiness activities may count as engagement in 
work for no more than 12 weeks per year. However, some 
of the barriers to employment that those activities try to 
address, such as mental health problems and illiteracy, 
can take more than 12 weeks to overcome. This option 
would allow participation in job readiness activities to 
count as engagement in work for up to 24 weeks during a 
recipient’s first year on cash assistance.
The option would increase the number of cash assistance 
recipients who counted as engaged in work, which would 
allow states to offer cash assistance to more families while 
remaining in compliance with the minimum work partic-
ipation rate. But states would have to spend more on pro-
viding job readiness activities, which are often expensive. 
To cover the cost, some states would probably spend less 
on other TANF-funded services.
In recent years, only about a quarter of adult cash assis-
tance recipients have had a job when they left the pro-
gram. This option would let states experiment with a 
wider range of job readiness programs in the hope of 
increasing that percentage. However, demonstration proj-
ects that are focused on job readiness appear not to have 
raised the employment rates or earnings of cash assistance 
recipients with barriers to employment, which suggests 
that this option would probably allow recipients to 
remain in TANF longer without moving them closer to 
self-sufficiency. By contrast, some demonstration projects 
that required such recipients not only to participate in 
job readiness activities but also to work have succeeded in 
raising their employment rates and earnings.38 But under 
current federal law, recipients who participate in job read-
iness activities and also work (or perform community ser-
vice) can already be counted for more than 12 weeks as 
engaged in work.
Option 10: Loosen the Limit on Counting Vocational 
Education as Engagement in Work. Under the current 
work standard, a cash assistance recipient’s participation 
in vocational education may count as engagement in 
work for no more than a year. This option would allow 
vocational education to count for up to two years, the 
37. Government Accountability Office, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families: State Maintenance of Effort Requirements and 
Trends, GAO-12-713T (May 2012), www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-12-713T.
38. David Butler and others, What Strategies Work for the Hard-to-
Employ? Final Results of the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration and 
Evaluation Project and Selected Sites From the Employment Retention 
and Advancement Project, OPRE Report 2012-08 (submitted by 
MDRC to the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, 
Research, and Evaluation, March 2012), http://go.usa.gov/m4Jk. 
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time typically required to complete an associate’s degree 
in a vocational program.
Like the previous option, this one would increase the 
number of cash assistance recipients who counted as 
engaged in work, which would allow states to offer cash 
assistance to more families while remaining in compli-
ance with the minimum work participation rate. But if 
the families of adults undertaking two years of education 
received assistance for longer periods than they do now, 
the amount of assistance available to other families would 
probably decline.
The option would allow states to encourage more voca-
tional education. The existing body of research does not 
indicate clearly whether providing more vocational edu-
cation to recipients would reduce the likelihood that they 
need cash assistance again in the future. Analyses of the 
shift from AFDC to TANF, as well as of more recent 
demonstration projects, have generally found that voca-
tional education does not lead participants to well-paying 
or consistent employment better than programs in which 
participants are encouraged to make a quick transition to 
work. However, none of the programs that were studied 
supported two years of vocational education.39 
Options That Change the Maintenance-of-Effort 
Requirement
In recent years, some states have met the MOE require-
ment by counting more spending from nongovernmental 
organizations. Lawmakers could prohibit that tactic in 
order to increase funding from state and local govern-
ments. They could also alter the MOE requirement to 
increase the portion of TANF funding that states allocate 
to cash assistance. Those two options would affect federal 
spending significantly only if states failed to meet the 
MOE requirement and forfeited some of their federal 
funding, and such failures would be unlikely.
Option 11: Prohibit States From Counting Private 
Spending Toward the Maintenance-of-Effort Requirement. 
In 2011, the most recent year for which data are available, 
13 states counted spending by nongovernmental organi-
zations toward the MOE requirement. In most of those 
states, spending by nongovernmental organizations 
accounted for 20 percent or less of MOE spending, but 
in two states, it accounted for nearly half.40 This option 
would prohibit states from counting nongovernmental 
spending toward the MOE requirement.
The prohibition would reduce the extent to which some 
states met the work standard by spending in excess of the 
MOE requirement; to meet the standard, a number of 
those states would probably make up for what they had 
lost by tightening time limits and work requirements. 
Such measures would be likely to shorten the average 
duration of assistance and could also reduce the number 
of families that received that assistance (see Table 4). 
However, other states might continue to rely on MOE 
spending to meet the work standard; they could do so by 
increasing their own spending on TANF, which could 
fund additional aid for low-income families.
Option 12: Require States to Spend at Least One-Fifth of 
TANF Funding on Cash Assistance. This option would 
require states to spend at least a fifth of total TANF fund-
ing on recurring cash assistance, which would probably 
result in a modest boost to the amount of that assistance 
available to low-income families. In 2013, the 19 states 
that spent less than 20 percent of their TANF funding on 
cash assistance spent $0.9 billion in total on it. If this 
option had been in effect, those states would have had to 
spend a total of about $1.6 billion; eight of them would 
have had to more than double their spending on cash 
assistance.
States could provide more cash assistance by paying fami-
lies more. Or they could make payments to more fami-
lies, a task that they could accomplish by loosening eligi-
bility standards and conducting outreach to increase the 
percentage of eligible families that applied for benefits. 
To cover the increased cost of the cash assistance, some 
states would probably reduce spending on other TANF 
services; others might spend more on TANF as a whole.
39. Ibid. See also Gayle Hamilton and others, National Evaluation of 
Welfare-to-Work Strategies: How Effective Are Different Welfare-to-
Work Approaches? Five-Year Adult and Child Impacts for Eleven 
Programs (submitted by MDRC to the Department of Health and 
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, and 
to the Department of Education, Planning and Evaluation 
Service, Office of Vocational and Adult Education, December 
2001), http://tinyurl.com/q2br4v5.
40. Government Accountability Office, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families: More States Counting Third Party Maintenance of Effort 
Spending, GAO-12-929R (July 2012), www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-12-929R.
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Table 4.
Effects of Options That Change the TANF Maintenance-of-Effort Requirement
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: These options would be unlikely to have a substantial effect on federal spending.
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
a. In this report, access to assistance is measured by the number of families receiving assistance and by the extent to which assistance is 
targeted at the families with the lowest income.
b. In this report, the duration of assistance is measured by the average number of months during which recipients get cash assistance over 
the course of their lives. 
c. The maintenance-of-effort requirement penalizes a state in which nonfederal spending on TANF is less than 75 percent of nonfederal 
spending in 1994 on the programs that preceded TANF.
The limited evidence available suggests that the less 
TANF funding a state allocates to cash assistance, the 
less time families receive that assistance. In 2012, for 
example, recipients in the states that spent less than 
20 percent of TANF funding on cash assistance had 
received that assistance for nine fewer weeks, on average, 
than recipients in the other states had. However, only a 
small portion of the difference in spending on cash assis-
tance can be explained by the shorter average spell of 
assistance per poor family; a larger portion is attributable 
to the fact that the states that spent less on cash assistance 
provided benefits to a far smaller portion of families in 
poverty—only about 10 percent of them.
Option Access to Assistancea Duration of Assistanceb Flexibility for the States
Option 11: Prohibit States From 
Counting Private Spending 
Toward the Maintenance-of-
Effort Requirementc
States might shrink their 
caseloads to compensate for 
the smaller credits, reducing 
access; or they might 
compensate by increasing their 
funding, making access grow.
Some states would probably 
reduce the duration of 
assistance.
States would have fewer ways 
to meet the maintenance-of-
effort requirement.c
Option 12: Require States to 
Spend at Least One-Fifth of TANF 
Funding on Cash Assistance
Families would receive more 
cash assistance but would 
probably receive less TANF 
assistance of other kinds.
Some families would probably 
receive cash assistance for 
longer periods.
States would have less 
flexibility to provide TANF 
services that accommodated 
local conditions.
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